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ABSTRACT 
The literature on social justice, and social justice movements themselves, routinely ignore 
nonhuman animals as legitimate subjects of social justice. Yet, as with other social justice 
movements, the contemporary animal liberation movement has as its focus the 
elimination of institutional and systemic domination and oppression. In this paper, I 
explicate the philosophical and theoretical foundations of the contemporary animal rights 
movement, and situate it within the framework of social justice. I argue that those 
committed to social justice – to minimizing violence, exploitation, domination, 
objectification, and oppression – are equally obligated to consider the interests of all 




I start this essay with a discouraging observation: despite the fact that the modern animal1 rights 
movement is now over 40 years old, the ubiquitous domination and oppression experienced by other-
than-human animals has yet to gain robust inclusion in social justice theory or practice. The good news is 
that the conceptual tools needed to rectify this situation are ready at hand. 
My goal in this essay is to persuade those committed to social justice to consider, both in their theory and 
practice, the interests of all sentient beings, not only those of human beings. To this end, I argue that the 
philosophical foundations for establishing robust moral status and moral entitlements for nonhuman 
animals are sound; that these moral entitlements make other-than-human animals proper and legitimate 
subjects of justice; and, from the fact that nonhuman animals suffer systemic and institutional domination 
and oppression, it follows that animal rights is a social justice issue. I conclude by urging those committed 
to social justice to consider equally the interests of all sentient beings. 
Nonhuman animals, justice, and social justice 
Before I unpack my argument, let me clarify four concepts central to it: sentience, moral entitlement, 
justice, and social justice. To say that a being is sentient is to say that there is something that it’s like 
‘from the inside’ to be that thing. That is, unlike objects like rocks or paintings, to be sentient is to be the 
subject of experience; to possess the capacity for joy, pleasure, pain, and suffering, capacities that make 
a moral difference. 
To claim that nonhuman animals have moral entitlements is to say that they possess certain capacities 
that grant them significant interests or rights. Establishing moral entitlements for other-than-human 
animals does at least two things: (i) it obligates us to respect these interests or rights in that it creates for 
us duties to animals, and (ii) it connects the moral status of nonhuman animals to justice. As Garner 
(2013) argues, it does this because 
[f]ocusing on justice in the context of the moral status of animals … directs attention away 
from how we, as individuals, ought to regard the treatment of animals (whether, for 
instance, we ought to be vegetarians), and toward the way in which the state [emphasis 
added] ought to regard their treatment. (p. 48) 
Justice is a complex, much-disputed notion; justice applied to animals is even more so. One focus of the 
project of increasing the moral status of nonhuman animals has been to point out how unfairly animals 
are treated. The notions of fairness and desert, of giving one her due, are integral to most notions of 
justice, most centrally in the work of Rawls (1971) but also in the more pluralist account of Miller (1999). 
For example, when we witness the atrocious confinement conditions that animals suffer in so-called 
‘livestock production’ facilities (that is, factory farms), and think, “Those animals don’t deserve to be 
treated like that,” we are expressing this aspect of justice or, to be more precise, injustice. As Nussbaum 
(2004b, p. 302) notes: 
[W]hat we most typically mean when we call a bad act unjust is that the creature injured 
by that act has an entitlement not to be treated in that way, and an entitlement of a 
particularly urgent or basic type. … The sphere of justice is the sphere of basic 
entitlements. [emphasis added] When I say that the mistreatment of animals is unjust, I 
mean to say not only that it is wrong of us to treat them in that way, but also that they 
have a right, a moral entitlement, not to be treated in that way. It is unfair to them. I 
believe that thinking of animals as active beings who have a good and who are entitled to 
pursue it naturally leads us to see important damages done to them as unjust. 
It’s that notion of justice, the violation of a basic entitlement, that I have in mind. 
Moreover, when I speak in this essay of social justice and claim that animal rights is a social justice issue, 
I am obviously not limiting the notion of social justice to human persons. The sense of social that I have in 
mind is a kind of revisionary notion about who, species-wise, may count as a legitimate member of 
society.2 The sense of social justice that I have in mind concerns itself with (a) the protection of certain 
rights and opportunities, especially for the least-advantaged members of society (Rawls & Kelly, 2001), 
(b) the distribution not only of economic resources, but of the advantages and disadvantages in society 
(Miller, 1999), and (c) systemic domination and oppression (Young, 1990). 
With regard to justice in general and social justice in particular, my intention here is to highlight the fact 
that mainstream theories of justice are impoverished because they ignore nonhuman animals. 
Fortunately, the work of Young (1990) provides a framework of social justice that can include other-than-
human animals. 
In light of these clarifications, I now turn to my argument: 
(1) If animals have robust moral status, then animals have significant moral entitlements of some 
kind. 
(2) If animals have moral entitlements, then animals are legitimate subjects of justice. 
(3) If animals are legitimate subjects of justice, and animals suffer systemic and institutional 
domination and oppression, then animal rights is a social justice issue. 
(4) There are sound philosophical foundations that establish that animals have robust moral status. 
(5) Animals suffer systemic and institutional domination and oppression. 
(6) Therefore, animal rights is a social justice issue (P1–P5). 
(7) Therefore, those committed to social justice must consider the interests of all sentient beings, not 
only those of human beings. 
A close look reveals that the weight of this argument rests on the truth of (4) and (5). To that end, in the 
following section I will clarify just two of the sound philosophical foundations that establish robust moral 
status for nonhuman animals. Following that, I will say more about the ways that other-than-human 
animals are the proper and legitimate subjects of justice and discuss the ways that nonhuman animals 
suffer systemic and institutional domination and oppression. Subsequently, it follows that animal rights is 
a social justice issue and that those committed to social justice should expand social justice praxis to 
include the interests of all sentient beings. 
Peter Singer: the equal consideration of interests 
Understanding the relationship between animal liberation and social justice requires first understanding 
the philosophical framework of the most influential animal ethicist of the last forty years, Peter Singer. His 
three central works on the issue include the locus classicus of the contemporary animal liberation 
movement, Animal Liberation (1975), the essay ‘All Animals are Equal’ (1986), and the first three 
chapters of Practical Ethics (1993), particularly chapter 3, ‘Equality for Animals?’ Understanding Singer’s 
argument for animal liberation requires understanding five notions central to Singer’s view: (a) The Basic 
Principle of Equality, (b) sentience, (c) the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests, (d) speciesism, 
and (e) the Relevance Principle. 
Reflecting on recent social justice movements such as women’s liberation, black liberation, LGBTQIA 
rights, disability rights, and others, we notice that one thing that underlies and connects these movements 
is a belief that, in an important and profound sense, all humans are equal. This belief, the Basic Principle 
of Equality, lies at the heart of Singer’s view. But what does it mean to say that all humans are equal? 
Given that humans differ from each other so significantly in their physical, moral, emotional, and cognitive 
abilities and capacities, surely, as a descriptive empirical assertion, claims of human equality in this sense 
are clearly factually untrue. The Basic Principle of Equality is not intended as a fully factual but rather as a 
normative concept; ‘equality is a moral idea …. a prescription of how we should [emphasis added] treat 
human beings’ (Singer, 2002, pp. 4–5). The primary central descriptive claim grounding the Basic 
Principle of Equality is the fact that humans are experiential subjects. We are the kinds of beings whose 
experiences matter to us, and thus we possess morally relevant interests (e.g., interests in our own well-
being), interests that things like rocks and paintings lack. In other words, humans are sentient. 
The Basic Principle of Equality, coupled with sentience, and combined with the interests that the 
possession of sentience provide, lead to the central principle driving Singer’s view: the Principle of Equal 
Consideration of Interests, the essence of which is ‘that we give equal weight in our moral deliberations to 
the like interests of all those affected by our actions’ (Singer, 2002, p. 8). When engaged in any decision-
making procedure concerning how we ought to treat one another morally, the Principle of Equal 
Consideration of Interests requires that we consider the interests of all humans equally. But since 
sentience provides the basis for the equality of human beings, and since human beings are not the only 
sentient beings, to be consistent, we must extend the principle of equal consideration of interests to all 
sentient creatures. The Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests requires that we weight interests not 
on the basis of the species (or race or gender) of an individual, but on her own merits, independently of 
such morally irrelevant considerations. Importantly then, the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests 
emphasizes the moral salience of our interests as individuals, not as members of a particular species. 
Yet, equal consideration of interests is not synonymous with moral equality3 and equal treatment. The 
principle of equal consideration of interests ‘commits us to treating like interests in a comparable fashion, 
a key principle of justice, but it does not tell us what interests particular individuals have’ (Garner, 2013, p. 
98). To privilege the interests of humans over nonhumans solely in virtue of species membership is a 
form of speciesism. Speciesism – akin to racism, sexism, and ableism – is a bias in favor of the interests 
of the members of one’s own species and against the interests of members of other species based solely 
or primarily on species membership.4 Speciesism involves the belief that members of one’s own species 
are more valuable than and morally superior to members of another species, a prejudice that often leads 
to discriminatory practices and institutional oppression. Just as the wrongness of racism consists in 
discrimination based on a morally irrelevant trait (namely, race), the wrongness of speciesism consists in 
discrimination based on a morally irrelevant trait, namely, species membership. 
To reiterate, equality for nonhuman animals does not entail equality of treatment, but merely the equal 
consideration of interests. Adjudicating differences in treatment between competing interests requires the 
last notion key to Singer’s view, the Relevance Principle. The Relevance Principle states that whether a 
difference between individuals justifies a difference in treatment depends on the kind of treatment in 
question: 
The extension of the basic principle of equality from one group to another does not imply 
that we must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant exactly the same rights 
to both groups. Whether we should do so will depend on the nature of the members of 
the two groups. The basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical 
treatment; it requires equal consideration. Equal consideration for different beings may 
lead to different treatment and different rights. (Singer, 2002, p. 2) 
Thus, equality for animals does not require, for example, that we grant pigs the right to vote, not because 
the interests of pigs are of less moral concern, but rather because pigs, unlike humans, have no interest 
in voting. On the other hand, since pigs, like humans, have an interest in not suffering, livestock 
production techniques that inflict suffering on pigs solely to satisfy the palates of consumers are 
impermissible. (Cochrane, 2012, p. 5). Singer’s view, combined with his utilitarian stance, champions 
maximizing the overall welfare of all sentient beings and condemns practices, such as industrialized 
livestock production, as discriminatory, immoral, and clear cases of institutionalized violence and 
oppression. 
Tom Regan: the case for animal rights 
In his influential book, The Case for Animal Rights (1983), Tom Regan rejects Singerian, utilitarian 
arguments for animal liberation and instead provides an account of liberation for animals that requires 
recognition that nonhuman animals possess moral rights. Though broadly Kantian, Regan’s view rejects 
the notion that only rational beings possess intrinsic value. For Regan, what matters morally is not 
rationality per se, but the capacity to be the subject of experiences that matter to oneself. Possessing 
certain physiological, emotional, psychological, and cognitive capacities, over-and-above mere sentience, 
makes one a subject-of-a-life: 
To be the subject of a life … involves more than merely being alive and more than merely 
being conscious …. [I]ndividuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; 
perception memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional 
life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference and welfare-interests; the 
ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over 
time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for 
them, logically independent of their being the object of anyone else’s interests. (Regan, 
1983, p. 243) 
Since a great number of nonhumans are subjects-of-a-life whose value cannot be reduced to their utility 
to humans, it follows for Regan that animals possess what he calls inherent value, a value that is intrinsic, 
independent of how animals are valued by – or valuable to – humans. Possession of inherent value 
merits the respect due a subject-of-a-life, and, consequently, confers upon nonhuman animals strong 
moral rights, specifically, the right to respectful treatment, never to be used or treated solely 
instrumentally, merely as a means but only as ends-in-themselves. 
For Regan, all who possess inherent value possess it equally. The possession of rights implies not 
merely an entitlement to equal consideration of interests, but categorical protection against being treated 
merely as a means to some human end. Unlike Singer’s utilitarian view, which allows for the possibility 
that individual interests may be trumped in cases where appeals to the general welfare outweigh the 
interests of the individual, for Regan, rights are, for the most part, inviolable, even if trumping them, or 
harming the rights-bearer, would increase general welfare. I say ‘for the most part’ because even for 
Regan, such rights cannot be absolute. Often the rights of one rights-bearer come into conflict with the 
rights of another. In such instances, it may be the case that in order to respect one party’s right not to be 
harmed, another party’s right not to be harmed must be overridden. 
Regan provides two principles to which we can appeal in such cases. The first he calls the Minimize 
Overriding Principle (or ‘Miniride’ Principle). The Miniride Principle states that in adjudicating between 
conflicting rights, if one course of action involves violating the rights of many rights-holders while the sole 
alternative involves violating the rights of fewer rights-holders-and if the rights to be violated, individually, 
involve the same magnitude and degree of harm-then the rights of the few should be overridden by the 
rights of the many. However, in cases where the rights to be violated are not comparable, then, according 
to Regan’s second principle, the Worse-Off Principle, we should mitigate the condition of those who 
would be worse-off and violate the lesser rather than the greater right. In other words, it is preferable to 
harm many individuals slightly rather than harming one severely. For example, given the choice between 
torturing one person to death or causing a million people to suffer a mild headache, it’s clear that we 
should choose the latter. With regard to animal rights, while it follows from Regan’s view that the death of, 
say, one dog is of less harm than the death of a healthy, neurotypical human being, importantly, it also 
follows that the death of a healthy, neurotypical dog is of less harm than the death of a human who is, for 
example, irreversibly comatose.5 Among other things, Regan’s two principles insulate his view from 
charges of speciesism since the metric and valence of harm is determined not by species membership 
but instead by factors such as the richness and complexity of consciousness, and the opportunities to 
satisfy basic as well as more complex preferences and desires, regardless of the species of the 
possessor of these capacities. 
Though it follows from Singer’s view that practices such as the confinement conditions found in ‘livestock 
production’ facilities, that is factory farms, are institutionally oppressive, immoral, and should be 
ameliorated (if not abolished), given that Singer’s view is largely utilitarian, it allows for the possibility of 
the instrumental use of other-than-human animals in cases where their interests are considered equally 
and such use increases aggregate welfare. By contrast, Regan’s theory condemns and calls for the total 
abolition of every form of nonhuman animal exploitation and any instrumental use of animals, even in 
cases where such use improves general welfare, advocating nothing less than the ‘total dissolution of the 
animal industry as we know it’ (Regan, 1983, p. 395). Specifically, the animal rights movement is 
‘committed to a number of goals, including: the total abolition of the use of animals in science; the total 
dissolution of commercial animal agriculture; the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and 
trapping’ (Regan, 1985, p. 13). For Regan and his adherents (e.g., Francione, 1996), true animal 
liberation can be achieved only through a rights-based approach, since only a rights-based approach can 
properly ground calls for the abolition of all forms of animal use and exploitation at the hands of humans. 
Though Singer and Regan’s views are just two among many well-worked-out theories of nonhuman 
animal ethics,6 I hope I have made clear that there exist sound philosophical foundations to establish 
robust moral status for other-than-human animals. In the sections that follow, I explore the ways that 
nonhuman animals may be the proper subjects both of justice, in general, and social justice in particular. I 
then discuss industrialized food production practices that demonstrate clearly how nonhuman animals 
routinely suffer systemic and institutional domination and oppression. It will follow that animal rights is, in 
fact, a social justice issue. 
Justice, domination, and oppression 
In light of this scholarship, there seems good reason to apply the notion of justice to nonhuman animals. 
The focus of much of this work is grounded in a kind of similarity relation, namely, that we should treat 
‘like cases alike.’ In this sense it is fair to say that, to a large extent, what animal ethicists are essentially 
doing is advising us not to act unjustly (Garner, 2013, p. 21). 
However, tension arises for including other-than-human animals as subjects of justice when we recognize 
that justice, particularly social justice, is interpreted by most political philosophers not simply as fairness, 
but in its distributive sense. As Miller (1999) notes, ‘[i]n the writings of most contemporary political 
philosophers, social justice is regarded as an aspect of distributive justice, and indeed the two concepts 
are often used interchangeably’ (p. 2). Framing justice primarily in terms of the distribution of resources 
seems to leave little if any room for nonhuman animals as legitimate recipients of justice, other than the 
role they play as property or commodities to be distributed among members of a human [emphasis 
added] society7 (Miller, 1999). 
When considered solely under the distributive justice model, animals fair poorly. Though Benton’s (1993) 
treatment of social justice goes a long way toward including other-than-human animals within a Marxist 
economic distribution model, the implications of social justice for nonhuman animals under such a picture 
remain relatively conservative, saying nothing about whether it would be just to continue to use other-
than-human animals for food or as experimental subjects (Garner, 2013, p. 21). Indeed, when restricted 
to the economic-distributive sense, social justice for animals seems, at best, impoverished. Yet, as 
Garner (2013) argues, once we decouple social justice from the distribution of economic goods, we allow 
room for justice to include the distribution and assignment of other things, such as liberties, powers, 
opportunities, goods and bads, rights, experiences, etc. In this way, social justice can include nonhuman 
animals since there are sound arguments to support the claim that nonhuman animals have morally 
significant interests or rights, and moral entitlements. 
Following Garner’s suggestion, we can now turn to the work of Iris Marion Young who provides a 
conception of social justice not based solely on the distribution of (economic) resources, but ‘on the social 
structures and processes that produce [emphasis added] distributions rather than on the distributions 
themselves’ (Young, 1990, p. 18). Young (1990) proposes what she calls an enabling conception of social 
justice in which justice refers ‘not only to distribution, but also to the institutional conditions necessary for 
the development and exercise of individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation’ (p. 
39). Thus, a robust picture of social justice for animals would include a critical examination both of 
patterns of distribution and their causes. Under this conception of justice, Young (1990) proposes that the 
aim of social justice should be to combat the two8 social conditions that define injustice: domination (the 
institutional constraint on self-determination), and oppression9 (the institutional constraint on self-
development) (p. 37). 
In the next section, I briefly explain Young’s (1990) conceptions of domination and oppression, and 
clearly demonstrate that, by Young’s (1990) or anyone’s definition, nonhuman animals as a class are 
subjected to the most egregious forms of systemic and institutional domination and oppression 
imaginable. 
Animal domination and the five faces of animal oppression 
With very few exceptions,10 all book-length treatments of theories of justice have excluded animals. This 
exclusion renders animals invisible as a group to whom social justice is owed or under whose umbrella 
they are to be included. The conceptual framework of these works assumes human exceptionalism11 and 
the texts of these works are rife with speciesist language. However, this fact does not render works such 
as Young’s (1990) useless or unhelpful in projects that seek to expand the sphere of social justice to 
include other-than-human animals. On the contrary, the framework Young (1990) provides is quite useful 
for expanding the sphere of social justice to include nonhuman animals. 
To my knowledge, only Gruen (2009) has thoroughly developed and applied Young’s (1990) view to 
nonhuman animals.12 Though Young (1990) unintentionally develops the notions of domination, 
oppression, and injustice through a speciesist lens, with little difficultly, we can quite easily appropriate 
and slightly reformulate these notions so that they are more inclusionary and less speciesist, while 
retaining the intended spirit of Young’s (1990) view. 
To that end, here is what a non-speciesist reformulation of Young’s criteria of injustice might look like: 
Domination is a structural, institutional, or systemic phenomenon that inhibits or prevents sentient 
individuals from participating in determining their actions or the conditions of their actions. Nonhuman 
animals are considered to be living within the structures of domination when humans can determine the 
conditions of their actions, either directly or by virtue of the structural consequences of their actions. 
Oppression is a systematic institutional process that immobilizes or diminishes a particular species 
through the ‘five faces of oppression’ which include: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural 
imperialism, and violence. 
Exploitation occurs through a steady process of the transfer of the labor and energy expenditure of 
animals to the benefit of humans, producing a relation of domination between them. Marginalization 
involves the deprivation of the conditions required for exercising capacities in a context of respect, 
recognition, and interaction. 
Powerlessness involves inhibition in the development of an animal’s autonomy and capacities, and an 
exposure to disrespectful treatment because of the subordinate status that the animal occupies. 
Cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant species’ experience and culture, and its 
establishment as the norm, measuring and devaluing other species in relation to that norm, marking the 
perspective of the dominant species as invisible while marking out the non-dominant species as the 
Other. 
Violence is a systematic injustice, made possible and even acceptable by and within a particular social 
context, existing as a social practice directed at members of a species simply because they are 
nonhuman. 
In light of this reconceptualization and the role that domination and oppression play in injustice, I wish 
now to highlight some of the ways that other-than-human animals suffer systemic and institutional 
domination and oppression through Young’s ‘five faces.’ 
Some ways in which nonhuman animals suffer domination and oppression 
By and large, it is permissible for humans to treat animals in ways that would be considered unjust and 
immoral were they perpetrated against even the most reviled of human beings. We eat animals often for 
no other reason than that it satisfies our palates. We hunt them for sport, wear their skins, perform painful 
experiments on them, cage them in zoos and circuses, and keep them as pets, practices codified at the 
cultural, systemic, and institutional levels. Gruen (2009) argues persuasively that other-than-human 
animals are routinely and systematically subjected to Youngian domination and oppression. It is not 
difficult to expand the concept of exploitation traditionally reserved exclusively for human laborers-to 
include nonhuman animals (Gruen, 2009, p. 162) Animals are exploited, commodified, and objectified in 
innumerable ways. They and their bodies are used for labor, as food, clothing, research subjects, and 
sources of entertainment.13 
Marginalization and powerlessness take place in many industries involving the use of nonhuman animals, 
as they are routinely forced to live (and die) in conditions under which they are deprived the ability to 
express requisite species-typical behaviors and capacities, conditions under which they lack any 
autonomy or respectful treatment, conditions they are powerless to alter. Though it may seem odd, prima 
facie, to characterize nonhuman animals as suffering cultural imperialism at the hands of humans, some 
human practices involve the universalization of the dominant species’ experience and culture, and its 
establishment as the norm, measuring and devaluing other species in relation to that norm, marking the 
perspective of the dominant species, or certain sub-cultures of the dominant species, as invisible while 
marking out the non-dominant species as the nonhuman animal Other. 
Animals killed in the name of human culture 
For example, some nonhuman animals are killed and hunted in the name of human culture. 
Contemporary American ranchers and sport hunters argue that their practices have cultural significance 
in preserving the rancher’s or hunter’s way of life. Or consider the month-long Hindu Gadhimai festival 
held every five years at the Gadhimai temple of Bariyarpur in southern Nepal. During just two days of the 
festival more than 250,000 animals, including water buffaloes, pigs, goats, chicken, mice, and pigeons, 
are slaughtered in sacrifice to Gadhimai, the Hindu goddess of power. In response to animal rights 
protesters in Nepal, the temple’s high priest argued that the sacrifice should continue and that the world 
needs to respect the traditional culture (Boone, 2014). (Animal sacrifice was subsequently banned at the 
festival in July 2015). Even our companion animals are forced to conform to the human rituals and 
practices that exist in the homes of their human adopters. (Gruen, 2009, p. 164). In this light, we can see 
how some other-than-human animals suffer cultural imperialism as they are measured, devalued, and 
marked as the animal Other in relation to certain human norms. 
The amount, variety, and degree of violence routinely perpetrated against animals is ubiquitous and 
unspeakable. Just one instance includes the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) who operate ‘live tissue 
training’ programs in which tens-of-thousands of animals are used in so-called combat trauma drills, 
medical training programs designed to simulate battlefield injuries. During the training, live goats and pigs 
are made to suffer gunshot wounds, stabbings, broken bones, dismemberment, burns, radiation, and 
poisoning, all without anesthesia. In a November 2006 New York Times piece, U.S. Navy corpsman and 
trauma medic Dustin Kirby describes one particular trauma training experience that included severely 
mutilating a pig in which ‘[t]hey shot [the pig] twice in the face with a 9-mm pistol, and then six times with 
an AK-47 and then twice with a 12-gauge shotgun. And then he was set on fire,’ after which the pig was 
kept alive another fifteen hours before dying (Chivers, 2006). 
Though animals are routinely subjected to the most heinous forms of domination and oppression 
imaginable, let me detail just one: so-called ‘animal agriculture.’ This example will be more than enough 
to demonstrate the kinds of injustice that other-than-human animals endure systemically on a daily basis. 
Animals raised for food 
Currently, 1.02 billion cattle and 1.2 billion pigs worldwide are raised as ‘livestock,’ while the number of 
chickens raised for food worldwide approaches 40 billion14 (U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA], 
2013). Most of those animals are raised in Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), or factory 
farms.15 CAFOs involve raising large numbers of animals in conditions of high-density confinement for the 
production of meat, eggs, and dairy products. 
Cattle raised for beef are castrated, dehorned, and branded, all without anesthesia or analgesics. At 
slaughter, improper stunning techniques cause some cattle to be dismembered while fully conscious 
(Rollin, 1995). Sows live out most of their lives in cramped, individual gestation crates where they give 
birth to between four to eight litters. Male piglets have their testicles removed, their tails and ears docked, 
and their teeth clipped, all without anesthesia or analgesics. At slaughter, improper stunning techniques 
cause some pigs to reach the scalding water bath-intended to soften their skin and remove hair-while still 
conscious (Rollin, 1995). Laying hens live out their lives in small, restrictive battery cages. To prevent 
stress-induced behaviors caused by overcrowding, hens are kept in semi-darkness and the ends of their 
beaks are cut off with a hot blade, a process known as debeaking, without anesthesia or analgesics. 
Laying hens on CAFOs are ‘spent’ and unable to produce eggs after just two years, at which time they 
are slaughtered. At slaughter, chickens are hung upside-down, their legs are snapped into metal 
shackles, their throats are slit, and they are immersed in scalding hot water for feather removal, often fully 
conscious through the entire process16 (Rollin, 1995). 
In light of our discussion regarding the sound philosophical foundations for the moral entitlements of 
nonhuman animals and their connections to (social) justice, it is important to note that recognizing these 
atrocious conditions as instances of oppression, rather than merely as situations in which individual rights 
are violated, facilitates a kind of paradigm shift wherein the very circumstances that make animal 
oppression invisible to us – namely, the ubiquity of domination, systemic violence, exploitation, and 
objectification of animals – act to make visible the injustice of such institutions (Gruen, 2009). 
I trust that I have made clear some of the ways that other-than-human animals suffer systemic and 
institutional domination, oppression, and injustice, and how and why animal rights is a social justice issue. 
However, hidden beneath some of the more striking ways that speciesism manifests itself as a tool of 
domination and oppression, I want briefly to turn to some ways in which speciesism intersects with other 
oppressions in less perspicuous ways. 
Speciesism: the foundational oppression 
Intersecting oppressions of race, gender, sex, class, and disability are being expanded to include 
domination and oppression brought about by speciesism. Though a number of writers have written on 
interlocking oppressions and the intersections of speciesism and institutional oppression involving other-
than-human animals,17 literature explicitly connecting Young’s (1990) work to animal ethics and social 
justice remains underdeveloped.18 However, a number of thinkers have identified the invisibility and 
salience of speciesism as a core component of oppression. 
For example, Cantor (1983) argues persuasively that ‘[n]owhere is patriarchy’s iron fist as naked as in the 
oppression of animals, which serves as the model and training ground for all other forms of oppression’ 
(p. 27). Jones (2013) calls speciesism a ‘foundational’ form of oppression, reminding us that ‘[a]nimals 
live, suffer, and die in circumstances shaped by human activities …. [which] are always entangled in 
social, historical, economic, and cultural processes that are patterned not only by speciesism but also by 
factors like racism and sexism.’ 
Wolfe (2003) notes that ‘debates in the humanities and social sciences between well-intentioned critics of 
racism, (hetero)sexism, classism, and all other -isms that are the stock-in-trade of cultural studies almost 
always remain locked within an unexamined framework of speciesism’ (p. 1). In what ways do the five 
faces of oppression, founded upon speciesism, manifest themselves as interlocking oppressions? Let me 
close by discussing, very briefly, just a few. 
Racism 
Speciesism and racism are linked in myriad ways.19 Historically, people of color and nonhuman animals 
have been subjected to similar methods of control and violence. The parallels between the Slave Trade 
and the systematic mistreatment of other-than-human animals is made clear by Spiegel (1996), while the 
tenets of scientific racism were founded upon the notion that people of color were a sub-species of 
human, closer to the ‘brutes’ than to ‘civilized man.’ 
jones (2014a) notes how: 
[a]nimal subordination lays the groundwork for racism …. Indeed, it was specifically 
among the keepers of ‘livestock’ (living beings treated like objects) that the practice of 
human slavery began. The very idea of ‘race’ among people grew out of the idea of 
‘breed’ as conceived by keepers of nonhuman ‘livestock.’ Their obsessive concern with 
reproduction and its control helps to account for the perversely sexualized nature of racist 
stereotypes and practices. 
Contemporary similarities abound in the way that people of color and the poor are caged and treated in 
the American system of mass incarceration in which people of color, who make up about 30% of the 
population, account for 60% of those imprisoned (Sayers, 2014). 
Sexism 
Feminists point out how the very same ideology that legitimates oppression based on sex and gender is 
the same ideology that acts to oppress animals. As Jones (2014b) notes, ‘[w]omen and animals, along 
with land and children, have historically been seen as the property of male heads of households. 
Patriarchy and pastoralism are justified and perpetuated by the same ideologies and practices.’ Both 
women and nonhuman animals are objectified as things to be possessed. The language of meat, 
slaughter, and trophy hunting often link speciesism with sexism in the sexualization of animals, women, 
and even weapons (Adams, 1990; Luke, 2007). 
Speciesism, racism, classism, and ecocide 
Modern industrialized animal agriculture provides a clear case of the intersection between speciesism, 
racism, classism, and environmental justice. For instance, the intersection of speciesism and classism 
can be made visible when we recognize that the consumption of meat and the wearing of certain animal 
pelts (e.g., mink, ermine, etc.) are class markers. 
Bacon (2013) describes how U.S. immigration and economic policies, in concert with Smithfield Foods, 
the largest pork producer in the U.S., created both an ecological disaster and worker displacement in the 
Perote Valley near Vera Cruz, Mexico, where massive pig excrement ‘lagoons’ polluted local water 
supplies and drove local farmers from their lands. Further, animal agriculture is the top cause of water 
pollution worldwide and uses more water than all other human purposes combined (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency [EPA], 2000). Clearly, the intersectional instances of domination, oppression, and 
injustice, involving speciesism, are ubiquitous. 
Conclusion 
I have explicated some of the sound philosophical foundations, constructed within the last 40 years, 
intended to expand the boundaries of the moral community to include of nonhuman animals. I have 
clarified the importance of these theoretical foundations in grounding social justice for animals. As with 
most other social justice movements, progress within the animal liberation movement moves slowly but 
steadily. I hope further to have persuaded those committed to social justice, to minimizing violence, 
exploitation, domination, objectification, and oppression, to consider equally the interests of all sentient 
beings, not only those of human beings, both in our theoretical work as well as in our activist practice. 
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Notes 
1. The term ‘animal’ is politically fraught and troublesome, primarily because its use acts only to 
reinforce human exceptionalism, a paradigm of division and oppression that perpetuates the 
dangerous and misguided notion that those sentient beings commonly referred to as ‘human beings,’ 
who are normatively and operationally interpreted as metaphysically distinct from and morally 
superior to so-called ‘animals,’ are outside and above membership in the ‘animal kingdom,’ a 
distinction that has served the interests of the dominant species at the expense those oppressed 
species. In this paper, I will instead use the terms ‘animal(s),’ ‘nonhuman animal(s),’ and ‘other-than-
human animal(s)’ to refer to so-called nonhuman ‘animals.’ Secondly, throughout the essay, I use the 
terms ‘animal rights’ and ‘animal liberation’ interchangeably in an effort to include all theories and 
movements that advocate greater moral status for animals, and not just strict ‘rights’ views, such as 
that of Tom Regan, for example.  
2. Recent work advocating greater inclusion can be found in Cochrane (2013); Donaldson and Kymlicka 
(2011); and Garner (2005). 
3. Singer (2009) argues against the equal value of all human life and for a kind of graduated view, a 
view that applies both to human and nonhuman animals. The moral valence of a particular entity is 
actually a function of what is called moral significance distinguished from moral considerability, that is, 
the question of whether an entity has any moral value at all. This distinction, though central in other 
contexts, is not crucial to my discussion here. For details, see Gruen (2012) and Jones (2014). 
4. The term speciesism was coined by Richard Ryder in a pamphlet in 1970 (Godlovitch, Godlovitch, & 
Harris, 1972). The term has come to have various meanings. For example, Nibert (2002) sees 
speciesism as an ideology rooted in and supporting oppressive social arrangements. Wolfe (2003) 
characterizes speciesism as a set of institutional practices that ‘Other’ and objectify beings based on 
species membership. Here and throughout this essay, I use the term in the sense that Singer and 
Ryder do. 
5. Disability rights scholars highlight the ableism implicit in views such as Singer’s and Regan’s, 
particularly the centrality that neurotypicalism plays in the conferral of moral status (Salomon, 2010). 
6. See Adams (1990); Gruen (2015); McMahan (2002); Nussbaum (2006); Rachels (1990); and Rollin 
(1992), for a few stellar examples. 
7. Tellingly, nowhere in the 214 pages of John Rawls’ and Erin Kelly’s Justice as Fairness (2001) or the 
337 pages of David Miller’s Principles of Social Justice (1999), two of the most prominent works on 
social justice, are nonhuman animals mentioned.  
8. Young (1990, p. 38) acknowledges that domination and oppression are not always distinct but are 
often overlapping forms of injustice. 
9. Young (1990) points out that, though ‘[m]any people in the United States would not choose the term 
“oppression” to name injustice in our society … [f]or contemporary emancipatory social movements 
… socialists, radical feminists, American Indian activists, Black activists, gay and lesbian activists-
oppression is a central category of political discourse’ (p. 39). 
10. See, for example, Garner (2013); Cochrane (2012); Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011); and significant 
portions of (Nussbaum, 2004a, 2006); and even (Bekoff & Pierce, 2009). 
11. The view – found in almost all western philosophical and political theory, which assumes that all and 
only humans are the legitimate and primary subjects of moral, political, and ethical concern because 
only humans occupy a moral sphere separate from and superior to that of the nonhuman animals – is 
known as human exceptionalism. See Gruen (2011, chapter 1) for a nice analysis of human 
exceptionalism. 
12. Andrzejewski, Pedersen, and Wicklund (2009) integrates Young’s (1990) five faces into their work on 
animals, though they do not develop it as fully as Gruen (2009). 
13. Animal products are found in countless consumer items including auto upholstery, beer, candles, 
chewing gum, cosmetics, cranberry juice, deodorants, fertilizers, Jell-O, hairspray, house paint, 
lipstick, marshmallows, nail polish, plywood, perfume, photographic film, pillows, red lollipops, rubber, 
sauerkraut, shaving brushes, shaving cream, soap, soy cheese, sugar, surgical sutures, tennis 
rackets, transmission fluid, vitamin supplements, and wine (PETA, 2012). In other words, it’s virtually 
impossible for those living in affluent Western societies to avoid their consumption on a daily basis. 
14. The focus of this section will be on cattle, pigs, and chicken. Other land animals produced in mass 
numbers for food and clothing include, but are not limited to sheep, horses, rabbits, turkeys, and fur 
mammals. 
15. For details on CAFOs see (Eisnitz, 1997), (Imhoff, 2010), and (Hawthorne, 2013).  
16. Surprisingly, there exist no federal laws covering the (mis)treatment of animals in the U.S. The U.S. 
Humane Slaughter Act mandates only that ‘livestock animals’ be made unconsciousness prior to 
slaughter. However, the Act does not cover the slaughter of rabbits, poultry, fish, or other animals 
slaughtered for food. The U.S. Animal Welfare Act of 1966 provides protections for some nonhuman 
animals in some circumstances, yet farm animals are excluded from its protections. See Jones (2013) 
for a discussion animal welfare legislation globally. 
17. See for example, Gruen and Adams (2014); Kim (2014); jones (2013); Gaard (2012); Kemmerer 
(2011); Gaarder (2011); Kheel (2008); jones (2007); Luke (2007); Wolfe (2003); Adams (2003); 
Dunayer (2001); Spiegel (1996); Adams and Donovan (1995); Gruen (1993, 1996); Gaard (1993); 
Adams (1990); and Cantor (1983). 
18. As I noted earlier, of the few who have (e.g., Andrzejewski et al., 2009; Garner, 2013; Nibert, 2002), 
only Gruen (2009) develops the relationship of Young’s work to animal ethics with any degree of 
thoroughness. 
19. For a stellar and original book-length analysis of the connections between racism and speciesism, 
see Kim (2014). 
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